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ABSTRACT 
This paper shows that different institutional structures for 
aggregation of preferences under maj ority rule may generate social 
choices that are quite similar, so that the actual social choice may 
be rather insensitive to the choice of institutional rules. 
Specifically , in a mul tidimensional setting, where all voters 
have strictly quasi concave preferences .  it is shown that the 
"uncovered set" contains the outcomes that would arise from 
eqt•ilibrium bet.avior under three different institutional settings . 
The three institutional settings are two candidate competition in a 
large electorate. cooperative behavior in small committees , and 
sophisticated voting behavior in a legislative environment where the 
agenda is determined endogenously .  
Because of its apparent institution free properties , the 
uncovered set may provide a useful generalization of the core when a 
core does not exist . A general existence theorem for the uncovered 
set is proven, and for the Downsian case , bounds for the uncovered set 
are computed. These bounds show that the uncovered set is centered 
around a &eneralized median set whose size is a measure of the degree 
of 3ymmetry of tne voter ideal points. 
1. Introduction
COVERING, DOMINANCE, AND INSTITUTION 
FREE PR OPERTIES OF SOCIAL CHOICE
• 
Richard D .  HcKelvey 
California Institute of Technology 
Recent resul ts in social choice theory for multidimensional 
choice spaces have shown not only the genericity of non-existence of 
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core alternatives (Plott [ 1 967 ) , Rubinstein [ 1 97 9) , Schofield [1983 ) ) ,
but also , the genericity of global cycle sets (HcKelvey [ 1 97 6 ) , 
( 1 97 9) , Schofield (197 8) , ( 1983 ) ) .  The conclusions drawn from these 
results have led to renewed interest in the role of rules and 
institutions in determining social outcomes (see e . g . , Shepsle and 
Weingast ( 1 981) , and Ordeshook and Shepsle [1982 ) ) .  The result has 
been a growing body of literature which explicitly models the 
institutional structure , and tben l ooks for game theoretic equilibria 
conditional on the strategies that are implied by that structure 
( e . g . , Shepsle ( 1 97 9) , Kramer [ 1 972) , ( 1 977) , McKelvey , Ordeshook and 
Winer [197 8) , and Ferejohn et al [ 1 980) , [ 1984) ) .  While these 
directions are a healthy devel opment in the fiel d .  one is l eft with 
the impression that , in the absence of core alternatives, little can 
be said about social choice that is institution independent . We argue 
h ere that such a conclusion is not warranted . 
While it may be necessary to model expl icitly the 
insti tutional structure if one wants to obtain exact solutions , there 
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appears to be enough commonality among the outcomes selected under 
different institutional arrangements so that nontrivial bounds on 
social choice can be determined which hold under several different 
institutions . Miller [1980) , in a very insightful paper , argued that 
for fini te al ternative spaces .  the "uncovered set" performs just such 
a function. The covering rel ation, as defined by Hiller ,  provides a 
method for transitively ordering alternatives for social choice .  
Miller argues that the resulting set of "uncovered" al ternatives 
serves as a general solution set for maj ority voting games. 
Specifically , he shows that under a variety of institutional settings , 
game theoretic behavior by participants l eads to outcomes in the 
uncovered set . 
The covering relation is closely related to the notion of 
dominance between strategies in two person games. As such . it has 
also been studied by other authors in slightly different versions . 
McKelvey and Ordeshook [197 6 )  define an "admissibility relation" which 
is quite similar to the covering rel ation. and show the connection 
between the admissible set and outcomes resulting fran two candidate 
competition. Fishburn [197 7 )  defines and investigates the normative 
properties of a set based on a dominance like relation. Richelson 
[1 980] shows the connection between Fishburn's set and the uncovered 
set, and introduces a choice set based on a more natural definition of 
dominance . More recently, Shepsle and Weingast [1984 ) have applied 
and extended Hiller's results to show how the covering relation can be 
used to get bounds on agenda reachable outcomes in multidimensi onal 
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choice spaces. 
This paper studies the dominance and covering relations in a 
setting that is of more immediate interest to economists and political 
theorists . Namely we assume mul tidimensional choice spaces with quasi 
concave preferences.  This is more general than Hiller ' s  set  up  in  
terms of  the assumptions on the al ternative set  and the social order . 
because we allow for infinite alternative sets , social indifference 
between al ternatives &nd more general social choice functions than 
�aj ority rule.  But it is less general than Miller in the assumptions 
on preferences, because restrictions are placed on the allowable 
preference profiles.  These are the standard continuity and convexity 
assumptions used by economists.  however. 
The results here are similar in spirit to those of Hiller .  and 
reaffirm the importance of the uncovered and undominated sets . 
Specifically , it is shown that the uncovered and undominated sets 
exist in this more general setti ng .  that the undominated set is 
contained in the uncovered set, and that the uncovered set contains. 
as subsets , the solutions which arise as game theoretic equilibria in 
several different institutional settings . Namely .  the uncovered set 
contains as a subset .filrl Von Neumann Morgenstern Solution. It 
contains the support set of any mixed strategy equilibrium to the 
r�lated two candidate competition game. Finally , it contains the 
outcomes that result from sophisticated voting when agendas are 
determined endogenously .  
I t  thus appears that the uncovered s e t  may b e  a n  important 
generalization of the core when core points do not exist . Namely, it 
allow� us to give restrictions on what outcomes might arise as the 
result of game theoretic or "incentive compatible" behavior of 
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individuals , under a number of different institutional mechanisms. It 
is thus of interest to determine the properties and relative size of 
the uncovered set. 
A final section of the paper obtains bounds on the uncovered 
set for the case of "Downsian, "  or "Euclidian based preferences. "  
These results confirm a conjecture of Miller ' s .  Namely , the uncovered 
set is a central ly located set which collapses to the core when one 
exists,  and which is smal ler the closer the configuration of 
preferences is to having a core. 
Section 2 introduces assumptions on voter preferences and 
derives some basic properties of the social preference relation. 
Section 3 defines the covering and dominance relations,  giving 
properties of both . Section 4 gives the basic existence theorems for 
the uncovered and undominated sets. Sections 5-7 show the relation 
between the three different institutional mechanisms and the uncovered 
set . Section 8 derives bounds on the uncovered set under the 
assumption of "Downsian" preferences, and Section 9 gives concluding 
comments .  
2 .  Assumptions: Voters and the Social Preference Order 
We assume there is a finite set, N, of voters,  a convex set 
X � ]lm of alternatives , and for each i a N, a weak order , Ri � X x-x
representing i's preferences. So each Ri is reflexive, complete, and
transitive. We let Pi and Ii denote the asymmetric and symmetric
parts of R i, respectively. 
We assW!le X is endowed with the standard metric topology , and 
- c 0 for any set A� X .  we use the notation pCA ) , A .  A ,  and A for the 
boundary , closure, complement , and interior of A, respectively. For 
an.)' binary relation Q � X XX. we use the notation xQy <=> Cx . y) 1 Q, 
and Q(x) = {y 1 X lyQx). Thus, Q can be viewed as a correspondence 
Q : X�X . Also,  we write Q1 = Q, and for any integer 
k > 1 ,  Qk = Qk-l o Q .  We wri te Q-k for the relation satisfying
xQ-ky <=> yQkx.  So xQky iff there is a k step path , via Q, from y to
x, and xQ-ky iff there is a k step path , via Q-l from y to x .
We now introduce the assumptions we make on individual 
preferences. Throughout , we always make the following assumption: 
AO : ( Continuous Preferences ) For al l  i 1 N, and all x 1 I, 
-1 R 1C x )  and Ri Cx ) are closed.
This assw.iption guaraDtees that each voter's preferences can be 
r .. prese11ted by a continuous utility function. In addition, to AO , we 
will make the following assumptions when they are needed. 
Al: ( Strict Quasi Concave Preferences ) For al l  i 1 N, and x . y  1 X 
with Y 1 Ri (x ) ,  if z = ty + ( 1-t l x .  with 0 < t < 1, then
Z E Pi ( x ) . 
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A2: ( Compact Preferences )  For all i 1 N and x,y 1 X. Ri(x) is 
compact. 
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Assumption Al requires that for all voters, the set of points that are 
preferred or indifferent to any alternative,  x. is always a convex 
set.  Further . there can be no "thick" indifference curves . Assumption 
A2 requires that the set of points at least as good as x must be a 
compact set . Typical economic preferences on m:. where more is 
better , generally satisfy Assumption Al , but not A2, whereas the usual 
preferGne:es assU111ed in political science , where there is an impl icit 
buJget c.:>nstraint , and individuals can be satiated . would satisfy both 
Al and A2 . In particular the quadratic based preferences of Davis and 
Hinich [ 1 968) satisfy both Al and A2 . 
We now define the social preference order based on a set 
li � 2N of coal itions in N. We call � the set of winning coalitions.
Throughout. we always assume 
BO: C� is monotoni c )  C i: i and C !; c• => c• i: i and 
(� is proper)  C s i => Cc I H. 
So every superset of a winning coalition is winning, and a coalition 
and its complement cannot both be winning. Another condition, which 
will be used when needed is 
Bl : CH is strong) C I H => c0 a li· 
We define � = { C  � N l c0 I Rl to be the set of blocking coal itions
( clearly H � �l . and L = 2N -� to be the losing coal itions. Note if 
H satisfies Bl , then� = H. and Land li partition 2N. For any 
coalition C � N. we use the notation 
xPcy <=> xPiy for V i i: c 
B 
( 2 . 1 )  
xRcy < = >  xRiy for V i a C 
for the coalition preference relations . and 
xPy <=> xPcY for some C 1 li 
xRy <=> xRCy for some C 1 � 
( 2 .2 )  
for the social preference relation. Note that P and R are related in 
that P is the asymmetric part of R, but Pc is not necessarily the
asymmetric part of RC . Also, for C i; N, and x e X, RC(x) is the
closure of Pc<x> if the Assumption Al on preferences is met (see Lemma 
1 of Appendix ) . 
Condition BO requires only that the set of winning coal itions 
be mouotor.ic and prop�r . �nd it allows for the existence of non-
trivial (i. e . , non-winning) blocking coal itions. Committee systems, 
bicameral system�. weighted voting . and a-maj ority rule are all 
examples of systems whose winning coal itions satisfy BO . Condition Bl 
requires that there cannot be non-trivial blocking coalitions. So 
every coalition must be either winning or losing . Systems satisfying 
Bl must always have rules for "breaking ties. " Majority rule with n 
odd, or maj ority rule with n even and a tiebreaking c hairman are 
exampl es (but not the only examples) of systems satisfying BL 
Throughout this paper, we will always assume both conditions 
AO and BO . Hence , they will not be expl icitly stated in the 
assumptions of any of the theorems. The other assumptions will 
sometimes be required, and they will be identified when they are 
needed . 
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In the appendix , we prove a number of properties of the social 
order, P. The most important of these are l isted here . 
1 .  (Lemma 4): Under Al ,  for all k = ±1 , ±2 , • • •  , both Pk and Rk 
are lower hemi continuous . 
2 .  ( Lemma 5,6): Under Al, for all x c X. 
( a ) . P ( x )  is starl ike about x ,  and for all y e P ·ex> and 
z = ty + (1 - t ) x ,  with t < 0, z 1 P-1 ( x ) . 
( b ) . Consequently, if P ( x )  � d. for every neighborhood, 
-1 N(x)  of x, N(x ) n P (x )  � d and N(x ) n P ( x )  � O. 
3 .  (Lemma 7): Under Al and Bl. for all x 1 X. if P ( x )  � d. then 
I!x ) � �(P (x ) )  � �(P-1 Cx ) ) .  So R (x )  = PCx l . 
The first property establishes cont inuity properties of the 
social order . Lower hemi continuity insures that points in Pk( x )  ( or 
Rk ( x ) ) cannot suddenly disappear with arbitrarily small changes in x .
The second property is illustrated in Figure 1 .  The first part says 
that if y e P C x l  and z = ty + ( 1  - t ) x ,  then if z is on the l ine 
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segment connecting x and ·y ( i. e . 0 < t < 1 ) , then z & P (x ) , whereas if 
z is on the ray emanating from x, in the opposite direction fran y,  
( i . e . , t < 0) , then z c P-1 C x ) . From this result ,  part Cb)  follows 
immediately. Namely, whenever P(x)  is empty. then any neighborhood of 
x must contain points both of P C x )  and of P-1 C x ) . The last property
shows that when the social order is generated by a strong game, then 
R ( x )  is the closure of P Cx ) .  
tx +(l-t)y • 
t > l 
Figure .!. 
z' • tx +(l-t)y, 
0 < t < l 
Illustration of P(x) for three voters 
Note P(x) is starlike about x 
For any y, z' E: P(x), and z" t P(x) 
3 .  The Dominance and Covering Relations 
We d&fine two binary relations. which we call the dominance 
and covering relations . respectively. They are both variations of the 
weak dominance relation, D � X X X which is defined as follows. For 
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any x.y e X ,  
xDy <=> P (x )  !: P ( y) and R (x )  !: R (y) . ( 3 . 1 )  
The dominance relation, D !: X X X is j ust the asymmetric part of D .  
So, for any x ,  y e X .  
xDy <=> xDy d - yDx 
<=> P (x )  !; P C y l  and R (x )  !; R ( y) , ( 3 .2 )  
with one inclusion strict . 
The second relation we define is a sl ight variation of the dominance 
relation, and we call it the covering relation. It should be noted, 
however , that the definition we give is somewhat different than that 
of Miller [1962) . Tne covering relation, denoted C !: XX X is defined 
by, for all x, y e X .  
xCy <=> xDy d xPy . ( 3 . 3 )  
The following propositions give properties of the dominance 
and covering relation and are proven in the appendix. 
Proposition 1-1 Both D and C are symmetric, irreflexive, transitive 
and acyclic . Further C !:; D. 
Proposition 1-� Under Assumption Al , D C x l  is closed for all x .
Under Assumptions Al and Bl , the defini tions of dominance and 
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covering simpl ify considerably, so that w e  need only verity one 
inclusion : 
Proposition 1·1 Under Assumptions Al and Bl , we have, for all x , y  e X 
xDy <�� P (x) !: P (y)  <=> R (x)  !: R(y)  
xDy <:> P Cx l  !: P ( y) <=> R Cx l  !: R (y) 
xCy <=> {x } U P C x l  !: P(y) <=> {x } U PCxl c P C y l  
The next resul t i s  a version of Miller• s "two step" principle ,  
which , under Al and Bl , also holds i n  the spatial framework developed 
here.  Namely,  x weakly dominates y if and only if it is not possible 
to reach y, in two steps , from x .  
-2 Proposition 1·! For any y , x  e X ,  x a P (y)  => -x:Dy .  Under
-2 -Assumptions Al and Bl , x a P C y) <=> -XDy. Equivalently, 
2 -Y I P C x l  <=> xDy. 
4.  The Undominated and Uncovered Sets 
The undominated and uncovered sets are defined to be the 
maximal el ements or the dominance and covering relations . 
respectively. Hore formally , for any binary relation, Q !: X X X and 
set A!: X. the maximal e lements of the relation Q in A are defined : 
M_( Q, A) {x e A l \/  y 1 A .  xQy or -cycix l }  
If Q is asymmetric ( as are the covering and dominance relations ) ,  then 
we can write 
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HCQ, A l  = {x e Al  I,/ y £ A. -yQx ) . 
Then we define the undominated set of! in A. written UDCX I A l , 
and the uncovered set of! in A· written  UCCX I A l  by 
UDCX I A> = MCD. A l  
and 
!Z..QCX I A l  = HCC. A l  
W e  write UDlX l for UDCX IXl and UC( X l  for UCCX IX l . and refer to UD( X l  
and UCIX) a s  the undominated and uncovered sets of X, respectively. 
Since C � D, it follows easily that UD( X )  � UC( X ) .
Our first theorem establishes existence of the uncovered set 
and the undominated set. With quasi concave preferences ( Assumption 
Al ) ,  to guarantee existence , it is sufficient to assume either that 
the alternative set is compact or that individual preferences are 
compact (1. e .  individuals always have compact "preferred to" sets ) .  
Theorem 1 Under Assumption Al , for any compact A� X ,  �<X I A> f fl and 
UCCX I A l  f fl. If Assumption A2 is also satisfied, then for any 
X !;;; ll m. UD( X l  f fl and UC( X l  f fl.
Proof : For any A!: X, it follows easily that H<D. A l  !: HCC. A l . This 
follows directly by Prop 3 . 1 .  since C !; D. But now , it suffices to 
prove the theorem for !!CD. A l  and HCD , X l , since the corresponding 
resul ts for MCC. A l  and MCC , X l  follow from the above inclusion. 
Let A � X be compact. and let E � A be a chain under the 
partial ordering inauced by D. We will show that any such chain has 
an upper bound in A. Set F = n [ D ( x l  n A]. If F i fl, then··pick 
x eE 
. ·- . 
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x E F .  So  x Dx  for all x e E ,  hence x is an upper bound for E.  If 
F = fl. then {DCx l c l x  e El is  an open cover of A,  since by Prop 3 .2 ,
each DCx l  is closed.  But then there is a finite subset G i;;; E such 
that {D( x l c lx  e G) is an open cover of A .  B y  transitivity of D ,  and
. ·-the fact G is a chain, there is an x e G with x Dx for all x a G.  
- - . 
Also by transitivity of D ,  D(x  l !; D ( x l  for all x a G. But then 
- • c - • - • A� D ( x ) , so D ( x ) n A =  fl. and� fortiori , D ( x  l n E = fl. I . e. , we 
. - . 
have x e E with xDx for no x e E .  But since E i s  a chain, w e  must 
·- . 
have x Dx for al l  x e E .  But then x is  a n  upper bound for E.  Thus . 
we have shown every chain E � A has an upper bound in A hence, by 
Zorn's l emma,  there is a maximal el ement in A ,  i . e  • •  HCD , A l f  fl. But 
MCD , A) = HCD, A l . since D is the asymmetric part of D. Hence 
!!CD. Al  f fl. 
Now if A2 is satisfied, and X is  any ( not necessarily compact ) 
subset of lRm then let E £ X be a chain.  Pick arbitrary x0 e E ,  and
+ I - I + set E = {y e  E yDx0J, E = {y e  E x0Dy) . Now E is a chain contained
- + in DCx0l ,  which. by A2, is compact. By the same proof as above,  E 
• • 
has an upper bound, say x , but x is also an upper bound for E, by 
transitivity . Hence every chain E � X has an upper bound.  Applying 
Zorn's lemma again, MCD ,X l  = !!CD , X l  f fl. 
Q. E.D.  
lS 
The two step principle can be extended to get upper and lower 
bounds on the uncovered set in terms of the set of points tha� are 
reachable in two steps from all other alternatives. When both Al and 
Bl are �et� then with the exception of points of closure, the 
uncovered set (and undominated set)  is characteri zed as the set of 
points which are reachable in two steps , via P, from every other point 
in X. In this case , it follows that UD( X )  = ll£(X ) , so the two sets 
are identical except for points of closure. 
Proposition !·!= In general 
n P2 C yl !; UD( X )  !;;. UC( X )  !; n R2 C y) . 
y� y� 
If Al and Bl are satisfied , and P ( z) I d for al l  z e X. then 
n P2 C y) !; UD( X )  !; UCCX)
yeX 
!; n P""C y>. 
ysX 
When Al and Bl are met, the above proposition gives a 
potential "brute force" method for computing UC CX l up to any desired 
degree of accuracy . One could simply check whether x c P2 (y)  for all
y on some fine enough grid in X. 
The next two resul ts give properties of the uncovered set and 
undominated set which are useful later in dealing with endogenous 
agendas : 
Proposition !·1 Under Assumptions Al and Bl, for all A� X with either 
X = A or A compact , and for all x e A, if x I UDCX I A> then
3 y e  UDCX I A> with yDx . Similar results hold for UCCX(A>. 
1 6  
Proposition !·I For any collection (xj } i; X with n P Cxj l I , , we have
j 
n PCxj ) n UD (X)  I - · and n P(xj ) n UC CX)  I - · 
j j 
It should be noted that for all x E n  P(xJ) ,  either x E UDCX ) 
j 
or there is a y E n  PCxj ) n UD( X )  with yDx . ( Similarly for UC(X ) ) .
j 
s. Scall Committees
Small committee behavior is usually modeled as a cooperative 
game, in characteristic function form . This provides a good model of 
the social outcomes that would occur in smal l  groups operating with 
unstructured rules of procedure . In this section, we define a simple 
characteristic function form game, without sidepayments .  whose winning 
coalitions are �. We then show that every Von-Neumann-Morgenstern
solution to this game is included in the uncovered set.  
Before proceeding,  we warn the reader of some terminological 
ambiguity which leads to considerable confusion. The word "dominance" 
is used in gC:&llle thoery with two distinctly different meani ngs . In one 
usage , it refers to the relation between two strategies in a non-
cooperative game. Here, one strategy dominates another if it is 
better no matter what strategy the opponents adopt . We will see . in 
the next section, that this usage of the word coincides with our 
rel ation D ,  which we have thus called the dominance relation. The 
second usage of "dominance" is in cooperative games, where it refers 
to a rel ation between two strategies adopted by , perhaps , different 
coal itions. Here . one strategy ( or al ternative)  "do1:1inates" another 
if there is some coalition which both prefers and can unilaterally 
insure the first over the second . This second usage of the word 
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"dominance" is the usage which is meant in this section of the paper. 
Since we will have occasion to use "dominance" in both of its meanings 
in this paper,  when there is the possibility of confusion. we will use 
the terms ·�dominance" and "v-doli!inance" to refer to the non-
cooperative and cooperative usages of the term. Here cl> refers to the 
yayoff function of tht corr�sponding non-cooperative game, and v to 
the characteri$tic function of the corresponding cooperative game. 
We define the characteristic function, v: 2N � 2X for a simple 
game without sidepayments by: 
v ( C )  = X if C E � 
v ( C )  = d if C � � 
For any x . y  e X and C !.:: N. we say x y-dominates y via c. written 
x >- y, iff xPcY and x e v ( C ) . We say x y-dominates y ,  written x >- y c 
iff x >- y for some C !.:: N .  It is trivial t o  verify that for the 
c 
simple characteristic function defined above . x >- y iff xPCy and c 
x >- y iff xPy. 
A Von-NeUDann-Mor;enstern Solution is defined to be any set
K !.:: X satisfyil16 
(a l V x . y  e K. -(x >- yl ( internal stability) 
( b )  V x f K. :h e K s .  t. y >- x (external stability ) . 
TteoreI!l �: Let Al and Bl be met. and let K be a VNM sol ution. Then 
K !.:: UC'Xl. 
Proof : We first show that for any x e K .  z I K, that -znx .  To prove
this, by external stability it follows that 3 Y  e K with yPz. By 
openness of P ( z) ,  it follows there is a neighborhood N C yl of y such 
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that y ' Pz for any y• e N ( y) . By internal stability, xiy. By Lemma 8. 
-1 P (x )  f &. By Lemma 7, we can find y• 1 N ( y) with y• e P ( x ) . But
-1 -1 -2 then y '  e P Cx l and z e P ( y ' ) ,  so z e P (x ) .  By Prop 3 .4. -zDx. 
To show that K !.: MCC , X ) , note that from the first paragraph , 
whenever x e K, z f K, we have - zDx.  But since zCx => zDx. it 
fol lows that - zCx. But also. if x e K. and z e K. then by internal 
stability .  - zPx so - zCx. Thus for all x e K ,  z e X . - zCx. Hence 
x 8 H<C.X l . so K !.:: MCC . X ) . 
Q . E . D .  
Typically , a Von Neumann Morgenstern Solution is not unique .  
In addition to finite solutions (where i t  i s  possible t o  view each 
al ternative in K as the proposal of some winning coalition) , there may 
be an infinite number of "discriminatory" solutions. The 
discriminatory solutions each contain an infinite number of 
al ternatives . and in some games ( for example majority rule "divide the 
dollar" games ) their union covers the whole set of Pareto Optimals.  
I t  is  w0rth emphasi�ing that the above theorem holds for � Von 
lleumann Morgenstern Solution. Hence i t  follows from the above resul t 
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that the union of all Von Neumann Morgenstern solutions ( i . e . , the set 
of all points which could result from some VN M solution) is also in 
the uncovered set. 
6. Two Candidate Competition 
The covering relation also turns out to have a close 
connection with models of two candidate competition. We can model two 
candidate competition as a two person, zero sum game,  with the 
candidates as players, who compete for the votes of the electorate 
through the policy positions they adopt. Thus , candidate strategies 
consist of an announcement of a policy position that they will adopt 
if elected,  and then voters are assumed to vote for the candidate 
whose policy position they prefer . Formally, we define a two player , 
symmetric z ero sum game as follows: the strategy spaces for both 
players will be s1 = s2 = X .  The payoff function, 4>: s1 x s2 � R for 
player 1 is defined by , for §= ( s1 , s2 ) E Sl X 52 
fl if s1Ps2 
ti < �.> = 1 -1 if s2 Ps1 
Lo otherwise 
Since the game is z ero sum , the payoff to player 2 is just -4>C�l. 
( 6 . 1 )  
I t  i s  easily shown that the above game has a pure strategy 
equilibrium if and only if there is a maj ori ty rule core point ( i.e. , 
iff �( P , X )  f dl. Hence , it follows from Pl ott's [1967] Theorem that 
there will generally not exist pure strategy equilibria to the above 
game. Despite the fact that there are no pure strategy equilibria,  
one can still make some statements about the policy outcomes which 
might occur . There are two ways of doing this : one is to look for 
mixed strategy equilibria,  and the other is to use Farquharson's 
[ 1 969] concept of "sophisticated" strategies. 
Before proceeding ,  we recall the definition of domination of 
two strategies for a non-cooperative game, and show that it 
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corresponds to the dominance relation, D ,  defined earlier. Given two 
strategies, s1 , t1 e s1 for player 1 ,  we say that s1 
4> -dominates tl if , for all choices of strategy 82 e s2 by player 2 ,
4> C s1 , s2 > 1 Cl> C t1 , s2 l 
with strict equality for some s2 1 s2 • But, from ( 3 .2 ) , 
s1Dt1 <=> ( a )  P C s1 ) !; P C t1 l and R C s1 > !; R C t1 > and 
( b l  P C s1 ) c P C t1 > or R Cs1 ) c R C t1 > 
H::iwever, ( a )  holds iff 
( Vs2 £ X) (s2 Ps1 => s2Pt1 > and Cs2Rs1 => s2Rt1 l 
<=> ( Vs2 e X l <cl> C s1 , s2 l -1 => cl> C t1 , s2 l = -1 ) and 
C 4> C s1 . s2 l i 0 => Cl> ( t� . s2 > i 0)
<=> ( Vs2 e X ) ( Cl>Cs1 ,s2l 1 
Cl> < t1 , s2 ) )
Similarly ( b l holds iff 
( 6.2 ) 
( 6. 3 )  
(6.4) 
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( 3 s2 e X) <!JI< s1 • s2 ) > !JI( t1 • s2 l l • ( 6. S l  
Together , ( 6.4 ) and ( 6 . S l  yield (6.2 ) .  Thus , s1Dt1 if and only i f  s1 
cl>-dominates t1 in the two person non-cooperative game of ( 6.1 ) .
Farquharson ' s  analysis of sophisticated behavior is based on 
the idea that players will eliminate from consideration any strategies 
that are game theoretically dominated ( i . e . , 4>-dominatedl . The 
remai ning strategies are called admissible ( or primarily admissibl e ) . 
Once the dominated strategies have been eliminated, a reduced game 
resul ts. and strategies which were previously not dominated may now be 
dominated.  Players can now eliminate strategies from the reduced 
game. The remaining strategies are called secondarily admissible,  and 
the resul ting game is called the second reduction. Proceeding in this 
fashion, one arrives eventually at ultimately admissible ,  or 
sophisticated strategies, which are those which survive all successive 
reductions . It is reasonable to think that when there is no pure 
strategy equilibrium, that candidates should confine themselves to 
ultimately admissibl e strategies ( or at least to admissible 
strategies). The following theorem shows that any sophisticated 
�trate�y as well  as the support of any mixed strategy equilibrium must 
be inside the uncovered set .  
Theorem 1: 
( a )  All admissible strategies ( and hence all ultimately 
admissible strategies ) for the game (6. 1 )  are included in .llQCXJ. 
( b )  If l:X � .!l.m is a mixed strategy equilibrium for the game
( 6.1 ) .  then the support for l, supp (l)  must satisfy supp (l )  !; .ll.Q(X). 
.f.!:QQ.f: Part ( a )  follows directly from the fact that the relation D 
corresponds to 4>-dominance in the game (6.1 ) .  Thus the primarily 
admissi ble strategies are included in �(X), which are in turn
included in .ll.Q(X). 
Part ( b )  follows from the well known fact that a mixed 
strategy equilibrium can not put positive measure on the set of 
dominated strategies. 
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Q . E . D .  
On the question o f  existence of mixed strategy equilibria see 
Kramer [197 8) and Rosker [ J. who show that for games similar to 
that of ( 6.1 ) ,  mixed strategy equilibria will exist . 
In the context of "Downsian. " or "Euclidian based 
preferences," HcKelvey and Ordeshook [1976) studied properties of a 
set very similar to the uncovered set ( called the admissible set in 
their paper ) ,  and showed that it contains the mixed strategy solutions 
and is a subset of the convex hull of the "partial medians . "  
Unforl�nately , this set is frequently not very restrictive. Under 
similar assumptions on preferences,  the uncovered set, on the other 
hand can frequently be quite restrictive, as is shown in th e final 
section of this paper.  Hence . Theorem 3 can be used to get nontrivial 
bounds on the support set of the mixed strategy solution to the 
candidate competition game .  
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1. Scpnistication S!l.9. Endogenous Agendas 
The third institutional setting we consider is a legislature 
operating under a set of parliamentary rules , where the motions on the 
agenda are generated endogenously .  We consider only amendment type 
procedures , where voters vote in a sophisticated fashion. Sane 
preliminary definitions are in order. 
We first define versions of the dominance and covering 
relations which apply to a subset of A !:;; X .  They ar e  defined in  the 
natural way . Thus, for any x , y  £ X .  
xDAy <=> [ P ( x )  n A!:;; P C yl n A ]  and [ R ( x )  n A!:;; R (y) n A] ( 7 . 1 )
and DA i s  defined to be the asymmetric part of DA. I .e . , 
xDAy <=> xDAy and -yDAx 
Also , we define 
xCAy <=> xDAy and xPy
( 7 .2 )  
( 7 .3 )  
For any A , B !:: X, the undominated set of! in� . written UDC AIB> . is
MCDA, B l ,  and the uncovered set of! in�. written UCC A IB l , is MC CA, Bl .
Again we use the notation UD( A )  = UDCA I A l  and UCC A )  = �(A(A l .  
The following properties are easily verified. For any 
A , B  !: x. and x.y E X 
a l  
b )  
if  A!: B.  then xDBy => xDAy I. e. , A!:;; B => DB� DA 
if B !: A, and x,y  a B ,  xCAy => xDAy .  I . e . , CA n B !:; DA n B.
c l  if B !:: A,  UDC A I B l  !,;;;; UCC A IB l  
2 4  
N ow  a n  agenda based .Q!! the amendment process is simply a t-
tuple Cx1 • • • • •  xt ) together with a voting tree, as illustrated in
Figure 2 .  x1 is  called the status .9.!!.Q, x2 the  motion, x3 the
amendwcnt, x4 the amendment to the amendment ,  etc . 
• ' 4 
� � 
x""J " 3 
/"-... /"-... /"-... �
x• x• x• �-
/\. A � A /\, /"... � /"...Kl X2 X1 llJ Ill ll2 Ill X4 Ill X2 X1 ll3 Jli. T.2ll1 ll5 
FIGURE 2 ILLUSTRATION Df THE AGENDA 1•r•2 . . .. •.I WITH 
SOPHISTICATED EDUlllALENT h1•:•2 • •••• •:I 
Given an agenda based on the amendment process, 
• • • 
Cx1.x2 • • . • •  xt l '  we define its sophisticated equivalent , C x1 . x2 • . • • • xt ) 
as follows: 
( a l  
C b l  
• xl xl 
for 1 < i i n • xi 
{x� if xi Px; for V j < i 
xi-l otherwise . 
( 7 . 4 ) 
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th • The i element , xi ' of the sophisticated equivalent is called
the sophisticated equivalent of node 1 and represents the outcome that
would occur for the agenda Cx1 • • • • •  xi) if no further amendments are
introduced ,  and al l  voters vote sophisticatedly . 
As discussed in the previous section, Farquharson ' s  [1969] 
notion of sophisticated behavior amounts to successive elimination of 
dominated strategies . However , in this case, the underlying game is 
�n n-pcrson non-coopera�ive game, where individual strategy spaces are 
y.:issibl� instructions as to how to vote at each node in the voting 
tree, and where the payoff function is the payoff that the voter gets 
from the final node which is reached , given an n-tuple of voter 
strategies. We will not write out the payoff function of this game 
formally , but resul ts of McKelvey and Niemi [ 1 97 8], and Gretlein 
[1 983] show that sophisticated voting in this game is equival ent to 
the type of behavior described by ( 7 . 4 ) . I . e .  all voters vote at 
early nodes on the basis of what they realize will happen at 
successive nodes.  
We now consider a fixed agenda � =  Cx1 •• . .  ,xt ) and set
A =  {x1 . x2 , • • • •  xk}. Tnen the following proposition extends a theorem
of Miller [1980] to deal with a social ordering, P, which may or may 
not be antisymmetric Ca  "tournament" in Miller ' s  terminol ogy) over A: 
• 
Proposition 1.1: (Mil ler )  In general , xt e UC( A ) . If P is 
• 
antisymmetric on A, xt e UD( A l .
• 
While the above proposition shows that xt £ U C ( A ) , in general 
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t�ere may be an even more restrictive subset of UC( A ) , that contains 
• 
xt . See Banks [1985] for a characterization of the set of 
al ternatives achievable by sophisticated agendas.  
The above proposi tion relates to a fixed agenda, Cx1 , . . • •  xt ) '
where the alternatives, xi ' on the agenda are given exogenously .
Further , the proposition only shows that the outcome  resulting from 
sophisticated behavior is in the uncovered set of A =  £x1 .x2 •• • . •  xt } '
where the covering relation, CA ' is defined with respect to the set A 
• 
rather than with respect to X .  It does not follow that xt must be in
the uncovered set of the whole space . Even if A n UC( X l  � d .  we might
have UC( A l  n UC( X )  = d. For example if A =  {x1 . x2 l .  where x2 Px1 • and
x1 e UC(Xl but x2 I UC(X ) , then UC( A l  = {x2J.
• 
Even though Proposition 7 . 1  does not establish that xt must be 
in the uncovered set of X .  it does prove a powerful resul t which 
becomes useful in analyzing what might occur if there is any 
endogeneity to the process of agenda formation. Namely, the 
proposition shows that for any x 1 X. no alternative y 1 X for which 
(Cy can be the sophisticated outcome of an agenda which contains the 
�wo .  If A fx1 ,x2 • • • • • xt} is such an agenda ,  then xCy => xCAy =>
• r I UC( A l • So by the proposition, y � xt . It follows that an 
individual can unilaterally quash any al ternative in c-1 C x l  by
introducing x on the agenda anywhere in the amendment process • 
Furthermore, the introduction of x on the agenda will have the desired 
cfft:c:t. (i•ewt:ly the t::l i.wination Of C-l (x ) )  regardless of whether the
individual knows the other proposal s on the agenda and regardless of 
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whether other players are allowed to propose amendments subsequent to 
the introduction of x .  
To formalize the above ideas, w e  first define ! t o  be the set 
of all possibl e  agendas. I . e . , 
! = { .l!:. I .l!:. = < x1 ,x2 , • • •  ,xt ) E X
t for some t].
• 
( 7 . S )  
and for any x E !. v e  l e t  x E X be the sophisticated outcome of the 
• • 
agenda x .  i . e . , if x = < x1 , • • • •  xt) '  then x = xt . Al so, for any 
X = <x1 • . . . •  xt l E !. we write A ( �) = {x1 , • • • •  xt l for the set of 
proposals on the agenda �.  and for any z e X ,  write 
!C zl = {� e ! I z e A (�) } for the set of agendas containing z .  
We can now define an n person game as follows: W e  let the set 
of players be N = { 1 ,2 • • • •  , n}, for each i e N. let ui: X � lR be a 
continuous utility representation of Ri ' and define the strategy space
for player i to be Si = X .  Given choices � =  < s1 , . . .  , sn) e � = TT Si ' i 
we define the payoff function cl>i: � � lR by 
cl>i ( �) 
• 
inf ui ( x  ) 
.l!:.£!( si) 
Thus, this game models the type of outcomes that might occur if 
( 7 . 6 )  
alternatives o n  the agenda emerge endogenously and are then voted on 
in the follo�ing two step procedure: First,  there is a period of 
agenda formation during which any individual has access to the floor 
and can introduce motions. During this stage, motions are made in an 
environment of incomplete information about how the amendments might 
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be ordered for voting or about what additional motions might arise . 
Once all motions have been made , they are placed on the agenda and 
voting occurs in a specific order, and according to the amendment 
process . During this stage , all voters are assumed to know the entire 
agenda and to vote sophisticatedly.  
For any two strategy n-tuples, � and 1 .  ve say that s and t 
are payoff equivalent if cl>i ( �) = f>i ( 1) for all i .  We obtain the
following result: 
Theorem f: If X is compact , and Al and Bl are met , the game defined
by ( 7 . 6 )  has a pure strategy equilibrium . Further , for any 
equilbrium, �. there is a payoff equivalent strategy n-tuple ,  
.! = C t1 . . . .  , tn) e .§. such that for any permutation T: N � N ,  and
I • resulting agend� tT( i ) '"" " ' tTC n ) ) ' tT< n l  
e M C C , X l . 
Proof: We first show that there is an equilibrium, �. We let  
• 
W ( si ) = [y e  X I y = x for some x e ! ( si ) } .  So
t>i (�) inf ui ( y) yeW ( si ) 
( 7 . 7 )  
We first note that, for any x £ X ,  W ( x )  = X - c-1 ( x ) .  Miller ' s
theorem gives us that W ( x )  !: X - c-1 < x l  and t o  see X - c-1 C x >  !: W ( x ) . 
note for any y e  X - c-1 ( x ) , we have -CxCy) => -(xDy and xPy) 
=> -( xDy) or yRx . But if yRx, then the agenda ( y , x )  has sophisticated 
outcome y,  an if -(xDy) , then by Proposi tion 3 . 4 .  
-2 3 x e P ( y) => z e X with yPz and zPx. But then the agenda ( z , y , x )  
r.as y as i t s  sophisticated outcome.  So  we  have proven 
WCx} = X - c-1 C x ) . But now , from Proposition 3 .4 ,  it follows easily
� J that X - C ( x )  = P-(x)  U R(x ) . Hence , we have that 
2 9  
W(x} P2 Cx} U R (x ) ( 7. 8 )  
Next . from Lemma 7 ,  i t  follows that P ( z) = R C z) whenever P ( z) F fl. and 
� 2 that P-(x} = R (x}  whenever P (x )  F fl.  
-- 2 Hence W (x} = R ( x )  when 
P(x)  F �- By Lemma 4 ,  R ( x ) .  and hence R2 Cx} is a lower hemi
continuous correspondence . But now. 
cl>i ( �) inf ui ( y) yeW ( si ) 
inf 
yeR2 C si} 
ui ( y) 
inf ui ( y) 
yeW ( si ) 
( 7 . 9 )  
But since R2 C si ) i s  l ower hemi continuous and ui i s  continuous. q>i is
upper semi continuous on X. Hence , since X is compact , fli attains a 
maximum. Hence an equilibrium exists to ( 7 . 9}.  It al so follows that 
if s =  C s1 , • • • •  sn) is an equilibrium. then either si E HC C , X )  for all
i. or there exists a "payoff equival ent equilibrium" in which all
strategies are undominated .  I. e., there are strategies 
1 = < t1 , . • • •  tn ) with ti £ H( C , X )  such that 1 is in equilibrium and 
Cl>i ( 1) = Cl>i ( s )  for all i .  T o  see this,  note that i f  for some i B N .
si I HC C . X) . then by Proposition 4 .2 .  3 ti e HC C . X) with tiCsi . In
this fashion. pick 1 with ti e HC C , X )  for all i e N .  But by 
-1 -1 transitivity of C ,  ticsi = > C (si ) ?;; C ( ti ) 
� � 
= > X - C ( ti}!; X - C (si ) => W C ti ) !; W(si ) = >  cl>i ( 1) 2 cl>i C �) . But 
3 0  
since§ i s  a n  equilibrium .  it must be that cl>i ( 1) = "i ( �) . So
.1 i s  an
equivalent equilibrium .  W e  can proceed in this fashion to eventual ly 
obtain an equilibrium. 1. with all ti in HC C , X ) . But now. the result 
• 
that td( n ) E HC C , X )  follows from the fact that al l  ti are in HC C, X) . 
Q . E. D. 
The game defined by ( 7 . 8 )  represents only� possible way of 
�odelin& endogenous forwation of agendas, and the theorem then shows 
t.nat all equilibria are payoff equivalent to equilibria in which all 
players re�trict themselves to the uncovered set.  Alternative methods 
of modeling the endogeneity of the proposals on the agenda would be 
indicated if legislators had more complete information during the 
motion making stage . We do not investigate those models here, but the 
same sort of considerations that drive motions into the uncovered set 
in the above model might also be expected to do so in other models .  
Proposition 4 .3 shows that it is impossible t o  construct any agenda, 
� = < x1 • . . . •  xt ) which will eliminate all uncovered points.  I. e .  for 
any such agenda, there always exists a proposal xt+l £ HC C.X) which 
when added into the existing agenda will be the sophisticated outcome. 
Anc Miller's theorem together with Proposi tion 4 .2 show the 
attractiveness of uncovered points in eliminating covered points .  
Based o n  these two forces we would conj ecture that any model of 
endogenous agenda formation which allows all legislators the right to 
introduce motions will resul t in outcomes inside the uncovered set.  
8 .  Size o f  the Uncovered Set 
Given the results of the previous sections . it would be or 
interest to characterize the uncovered set as a function of the 
particular preference profil e.  Mill er [1980] conjectures that the 
uncovered set will generally be a small ,  centrally located set.  We 
have not been abl e to obtain resul ts for general preference profiles 
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satisfying Al or A2. However ,  for the special case or Euclidian based 
preferences ,  we have been abl e to calculate bounds on the uncovered 
set.  These results show that the uncovered set is indeed a "centrally 
located" set which collapses to the core when a core exists. and which 
is small if the preference configuration is "close" to having a core.  
We assume in this section that X = Jim, and that preferences
are of the followir.ig form. 
A3: (Euclidian based preferences)  For all i r: N, 3xi e X such that
for all x . y  r: X 
xRy <=> l l x - xiii i l ly - xiii. 
These are the usual "Downsian" preferences, and xi is called voter i • s 
ideal point. 
Additionally . we assume that the social preference order is 
generated by majority rul e .  Here we write n c I N I .  
B2 : ( Majority rule )  n is odd and�= (C �HI l c l 2. n ; 1 1 
Clearly preferences satisfying A3 satisfy AO-A2, and if B2 is 
satisfied , then BO and Bl are satisfied, hence all of the results of 
3 2
the previous sections apply here.  
Now. for any a e lR m and c e lR • write
H ( a , c )  = {x r; lRm lx • a = c } . ( 8 . 1 )  
So H C a , c) i s  a n  m - 1 di mensional hyperplane i n  lRm. The hyperplane 
P.'a . c )  is a median hyperplane if 
I {1 r; N lxi 
and 
l £i e N lxi 
n a <  c J I .{ 2 
a >  c J I l � 
We let H denote the set of all median hyperplanes.
( 8 . 2 )  
+ -Next . for any y £ X and t r: m • let B ( y, t )  be the closed ball 
with center at y and radius t .  So 
B ( y, t )  { x  1 xi l ly - xii i t J . 
We let � denote the set of all such bal ls which have non empty 
ir.itersectioru; with each H £ fi. I. e .
- + � = {B(y, t>!y e X ,  t r: :m • and for V H £ fi, H n B ( y , t )  F OJ . 
( 8 . 3 )  
( 8 . 4 )  
I t  i s  easily shown that under the assumptions made . there is a unique 
element , say B ( y . t)  of� satisfying, for \/B(y, t )  £ �. ti t .  The 
el ement B(y,t) of � is called the Generalized Median Set , or the 
"yolk" for short.  It  is the ball of minimum radius , which intersects 
every median hyperplane . The point y is referred to as the 
generalized median point . See Figure 3 for an illustration of this 
construction. 
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The yolk can be computed as a solution to a linear programming 
probl em . Let H1 , H2 , • • . •  Hk be the set of all median hyperpl an�s which
contain at l east two ideal points on the hyperplane. Assume a. and c. l. l. 
are the parameters describing Hi . Without loss of generality we can
assume that II ai II = 1 for all i .  So Hi (x e ]l 
m 
Since the distance from any y e  ]lm to Hi is given by 
x·ai = c) . 
y·ai - ci l . it
foll ows that y and t are the solution to the foll owing L . P . : 
minimize t 
s . t .  t 2 y•ai - ci for V l iiiK 
t }. Ci - y-ai 
fl&URE l EXAMPLE Of THE CONSTRUCTION Of It r. i I fDft A 
PREFERENCE CONFIGURATION Of SEVE• VOTEAS IN 
TWO OllllNSKl-S. 
34 
t!ext. given x
* , y* e X. and t• e R .  define c;ll1 c x* , y* , t* > to be 
• the region bounded by the m dimensional cardioid which has cusp at x , 
center at y* , eccentricity of t* , and radius of r* = l lx* - y* l l . See
Figure 4. This is defined formally in Appendix B .  
The following resul ts are proven i n  the Appendi ces.  See 
Figure S for an illustration. 
Proposition!-! Under Assumptions A3 and B2 , for all x e X 
Cm( x,y, - 2t) !: P ( x )  !: R (x ) !: �( x,y,2tl 
Further , the following relation follows directly from the 
definition of the sets cncx . y . t l
Proposition 8 .2 Under Assumptions A3 and B2 , for all x e X .  if 
t = l l x - ylf, then
�( x,y,2tl s;;: B ( y , t  + 2tl 
'Bc'Y . t  - 2tl !: �cx.'Y. - 2ti
Putting together the above results,  we get the following 
propositi on: 
Proposition 8.3 Under Assumptions A3 and B2 , then for all x e X ,  
setting t = I Ix - yl I, we have 
B(y , t  - 4tl i; DCxl and 
X - D-1 C xl i; BCy , t + 4t) .
The proposition gives bounds on the set of points that cover and are 
.· .·__/·
x• 
FIGURE' THE CARDIOD C21 •'. y', t' l I HERE r' • II 1'-y' 11 l 
Jl 
C2la,y,-2il 
FIGURE 5 EXAMPLE OF P(a) AND R (1) FDR lWD 
UIMENSIDNAL CASE 
C2lx,y,2il 
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covered by a point x e x. While the proposition is  not our primary 
concern,  it does have some implications worth noting . Shepsle and 
Wei ngast [1984] prove that the set of reachabl e points under "forward" 
agendas , ( i . e .  agendas of the form Cx1 .x2 • • • • •  xk , xl. where first xk is
voted against x ,  then the winner against xk-l ' etc . )  is exactly
X - D-l ( x ) . It follows that with a sophisticated agenda one can 
never reach from a point x ,  an al ternative y for which 
I ly - yl I > I Ix - ii I + 4t. So "forward" building sophisticated
agendas are constrained in how far they can wander fran the 
generalized median point , y 
Theorem S Under the assumptions of Proposi tion 8.3 , UC CX)  !; BCy,4t) 
Proof: For any x e B(y,4t), by Prop 8. 3 .  ye D (x) and y e  P (x). hence 
x I UC(X ) . 
Q . E . D . 
The above proposition and theorem are illustrated i n  Figures 6 
and 7 .  
The crucial parameter here i s  t .  As i s  described i n  Ferejohn, 
McKel vey , and Packel [1984). the si ze of t can be thought of as a 
measure of the sy!lllLetry of the distribution of ideal points .  In the 
case when a total mul tidimensional median point exists, then t will be 
zero.  since all median planes go through that point . In the more 
general cases ,  t is the radius of a smallest sphere needed to 
intersect al l medians. So if there is just a small deviation fran the 
I 
�D(x) 
qj--!__qj 
FIGURE 6 ILLUSTRATION OF "Prop. B.l FOR TWO 
DIMENSIONAL EXAMPLE 
.. , 
Ei!'j,411 
FIGURE 7 LIMITS FDR THE UNCOVERED SET FOR EXAMPLE 
DFFIGURE 2 U(XJ!; ilr,4il 
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case when a total median exists, t woul d be smal l .  For larger 
deviations it will be larger . The smaller t is. the less lati tude 
there is in terms of the size of the uncovered set.  and the size of 
the set of reachable points.  
As far as the location of the uncovered set, we see fran the 
theorem, together with the observations that have been made on the 
size of the yol k ,  that at least for the "Downsian" case . the 
conjecture of Miller is correct . Namely the uncovered set is a 
centrally located set. It collapses to  the core.  or majority rule 
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equilibrium when one exists,  and will be small when the configuration 
of ideal points is perturbed slightly from a core configuration. It 
is centered around a generalized median set whose size is a measure of 
the degree of nonsymmetry of the ideal points • 
9 .  Conclusion 
We have shown that three different institutional processes all 
lead to points inside the uncovered set.  Also. in the case of 
Euclidian based preferences ,  we have shown that the uncovered set is 
bounded by a sphere centered about a generalized median set--the 
"yolk. " This set , in turn, is shown to be a centrally located set 
which is equal to the core, or total medi an when one exists . and which 
is small when preferences are "close" to having a core . 
Other results have also identified the general ized median set , 
to be of particular importance . Ferejohn et .!l [1984] show that a 
Markov process. where new proposals are generated randomly to beat the 
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previous status quo ,  has a limiting distribution w hich i s  centered 
about this set .  
Al though the uncovered set encompasses the equilibria for 
several different institutions . it should be emphasized that the 
uncovered set is not a catch-all . In particular , Kramer and McKelvey 
[1984] show that the "milllllax set" is not included in the uncovered 
set . Further , any process which can pick Pareto dominated points�such 
as the "sophisticated voting equilibrium" of Kramer [1972].  or the 
"institution induced equilibrium" of Shepsle [ 1 97 9] can clearly lead 
to points outside the uncovered set.  Even the Markov process of 
Ferej ohn et al [ 1 980] , described above can select points outside the 
uncovered set . While the limiting distribution for the �.arkov process 
is centered about the generalized median set it can put some 
probability beyond the distance (of 4tl  which bounds the uncovered 
set.  A subject for future research will be to try and identify the 
characteristics of institutions whose equilibria lie in the uncovered 
set.  
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APPE!lDIX A 
In this appendix. we prove the resul ts label ed as 
"Proposi tions" in the body of the paper . We first round up a herd of 
lemmas , which characterize various properties of the social order, P.  
and w hich are used in the proofs of the main results. Throughout the 
Appendix . since assumptions AO and BO are always made, they will not 
be explicitly stated as assumptions in the results. 
Lemma 1 Under Assumption Al , for any x e X and C !:: N ,  if Pc( x l  I d .
then Rc< x l  = Pc( x ) . 
Proof : We first show that 
n Pi ( x )  = PC( x lhC 
( A . l l  
W e  can use the properties o f  closure of intersections of sets to 
obtain PC( x l  = n Pi ( x )  � n Pi( x ) . To show the reverse inclusion,ieC i eC 
let Y e  0 Pi ( x ) . Then y e  Ri ( x )  for all i e C .  But now leti eC 
L = { z  = ty + ( 1  - t l x l o < t < 1) . Then, by Al ,  L !:: Pi ( x l  for all
i E c .  an� N C yl n L I d for all neighborhoods N ( y) of y.  Hence , 
! Hy)  n Pi C x l  I d .  so y e Pc (x) . Using ( A. l l , we now get
Rc C x l  n RiC x lieC n P. C x l  = PC C x l . i eC 1 
Lem:na l For all i e N, Pi is an open correspondence . 
Q . E. D .  
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� Let ui :X  -7 :m be a continuous utility representation of Pi ' and 
let cx0 , y0 l £ Pi . I . e .  x0Piy0 , or ui cx0 l > ui C y0l .  
Set
£ = ui cx0l - ui C y0l, and find neighborhoods N Cx0l and N C y0l of x0 and
y0 respectively such that x e N C x0l => uiC x l  > ui C x0l - } and 
e y £ N C y0 l � ui ( yl < ui C y0 l + 2· Then, for x e N C x0> and y e  N ( y0J ,
ui C x l  > ui Cxol - i = ui < Yol + i > ui ( y)
So N C x0) X N ( y0l is an open neighborhood of C x0 , y0l contained in Pi . 
Hence Pi is open.
k LelllI!la l For all k = ±1 , ± 2 ,  • • • •  P is an open correspondence. 
Proof: For k = 1 ,  we have P1 = p u n Pi . 
CEH. i eC 
Q .E.D.  
k so since,  by Lemma 2 ,  each Pi is open, so is P. Now assume P is 
k+l k+l 3 open, and we show that P is.  If Cx0 . y0l e P , then z e X such
k k 1 that x0P z and zP y0 • By openness of P and P , there are
neighborhoods N (x0J and N C y0l of x0 and Yo such
 that x e N Cx0> => xP z 
k and y e N C y0) => zP y 
k+l k+lBut then N Cx0) X N C y0 l !;;; P , so P is open. Finally , for k 
negative,  the resul t follows from the observation that 
( x , y) e Pk< => ( y , x )  £ p-k. 
Q . E . D. 
4 2  
Le mma ! Under Assumption Al , for all k = ±1 , ± 2 ,  • • • •  both Pk and Rk are
lower hemi continuous correspondences.  
Proof : Lower hemi continuity of P follows directly from Lemma 3 ,  since 
P = P1 is an open correspondence . Then by induction l ower hemi 
contin�ity of Pk follows because Pk = P o Pk-l is the composition of 
two l ower hemi continuous correspondences. Note that lower hemi 
continuity of Pk does not depend on assumption Al . 
To show that R is l ower hemi continuous, apply Lem.ma 1 to get. 
for P Cx )  � d .  R (x )  = U Rc( x )  = U Pc<x>  = U Pc( x ) . For P ( x l  = d.
CE� CEB CeB 
R (x )  = (x) . Since x e R (x )  for P C x l  � d .  we can write 
R C x l  (x) U U Pc < x l . 
CeB 
But U PcC x )  is open, hence l . h . c .CeB 
Then, by 
proposition l l . 1 9( b )  of Border , U PC ( x l  is l . h. c . Also (x) is  l . h . c . CeB 
Then since the union of two l . h . c .  correspondences is l . h . c. , this 
proves R is l . h . c .  The result for Rk follows as above for Pk. 
Q. E.D.  
Lemma � Under Assumption Al , for all x e X ,  P(x)  is starlike about x.  
Futher , for all y e P (x) , if z = ty + C l - t)x,  with t < 0,  then 
-1 z e P ( x ) . 
Proof:  To show that P (x )  is starlike about x ,  we must show that for 
all y e X ,  if y e  P (x ) , then z = ty + ( 1-t l x  e P (x )  whenever 
O < t < 1 .  But by strict quasi concavity ,  for all i s N ,  if 
y e  P1 C x l . then z e Pi (x).  So, for any C !; N, yPcx => zPcx .  To show
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the second assertion, pick x e X ,  y £ P (x )  and z = ty + ( 1  - t ) x  for 
t o .  1 Then x = rz + ( 1  - r ) y, where r = l-t " So O < r < 1 .  · · and x is
a convex combination of z and y. Now for all i e N ,  we have 
yPix => xPiz .  To see this ,  suppose not . I . e .  suppose yPix and zRix .
By completeness of Ri ' either yRiz or zRiy .  But by strict quasi
concavity, yRiz => xPiz '  and zRiy => xPiy.  Either of these yields a 
ccntradiction, so we must have yPix => xPiz '  but then for any 
-1 C '= N, yPcx => xPcz ,  hence yPx => xPz => z e P C x l . 
Q . E. D . 
Lemma i Under Assumption Al , for al l  x ,  if P (x )  I d , then for every
neighborhood , N ( x )  of x ,  N C x l  n P C x l  I d and N ( x )  n P-1 C x )  F d .
Proof: The result follows immediately from Lemma S .
Q . E. D .  
Lemma 1 Under Assumption Al and Bl , then for all x e X ,  i f  P (x )  f D .
I Cx l  = P C P C x l l = P C P-1 C x ) ) .  S o  R Cx l  = P ( x ) . 
Proof: First , it is clear that P CP (x ) ) £ I (x )  and P C P-1 C x ) ) !;; I (x ) . 
To see this,  assume y e  P C P Cx ) ) .  Then any neighborhood of y must 
� J intersect P (x l  and X - P (x )  = R C x l . But then y , P C x l  because P ( x )  
-1 -1 -1 is open. and y I p ( x )  because p ( x )  is open and p ( x )  n P ( x )  = e .
But P (x ) , P-1 C x l  and I (x )  partition X ,  so we must have y a  I (x ) . A 
similar argument shows P C P-1 C x ) ) !;;; I ( x ) . 
Now, to show I ( x )  !;;; p (P (x ) )  and I ( x )  '= P CP-1 C x l ) ,  pick
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y e  I (x ) . If y = x ,  then the resul t follows from Lemma 6 .  If y f x ,
then pick z = ty + ( 1  - t l x  where O < t < l ,  and w = sy + ( 1  � s l x , 
where s > 1 .  By strict quasi concavity , we have, for all i e N ,  
yRix => zPix 
( A . 2 )  
xRiy = >  xPiw 
But then n odd and xiy means (i e N I  xPiy)  ; H and (i e N lyPix)  ; H 
or , equival ently (i e H l yRix) e !l and (i e N lxRiy)  e !\. By the
assumption that H is strong and proper , it follows !l = H. so we can 
replace !l by H in the above expressions , but then, from equation 
C A . 2 ) , it follows that 
and 
(i £ H lyRix) !; (i e N l zPix)
(i e N lxRiy) !: (i e N l xPiw)
Hence , by property ( a )  of H.  (i a N l zPix)  e H and {i e N lxPiw) e R ·
So z e P (x )  and w e  P-1 C x ) . Since t and s are arbitrary , z and w can
be chosen to be in any neighborhood N ( y) of y.  Hence y e  P CP Cx l )  and 
-1 Y e  µ cp (x ) ) .  This completes proof of the first statement of the 
Lemma.  The fact that R (x )  = P(x)  now follows immediately from the 
fact that I C x )  = P CP (x ) ) .  
Q . E. D .  
Lemm2 � Undtr Assumptions Al and Bl , if x . y  e X with x f y, and 
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z = ty + ( 1  - t ) x  with O < t < 1,  then y e  R (x )  => z e P (x ) . "Further , 
R (x )  satisfies the same properties as P (x )  in Lemmas 5 and 6 .  
Proof Let x, y, z be as described in the Lemma, and y e  R (x ) . Then 
-XPy means {i e N lxPiy) I H or , taking the complement and using the
fact H is strong and proper,  {i £ N lyRixJ e � = H 
But then , by strict quasi concavity , yRix => zPix for all i, so 
{i e N lyRix )  !:: { i e N l zPix )
so,  by property ( a )  o f  H.  { i  £ N l zPix )  e H · Hence zPx .  The remainder
of the Lemma follows by similar arguments to those of Lemmas 5 and 6 .  
Lemma � Under Assumptions Al and Bl , for all x , y  E X  with x f y,
P(x) n P ( y) i 0 whenever P(x) and P ( y) are non empty. 
Proof: Assume, for some x , y  £ X that
P {x )  n P ( y) o .
then, we must have xiy . Otherwise , if for exampl e xPy , then by 
openness of P ( y) , there is a neighborhood N ( x )  of x such that 
Q . E . D .  
C A . 3 )  
N C x l  !: P ( y) , and since P (x )  n PCy l  = 0 .  w e  must have N ( x )  n P ( x )  = O .
But this contradicts Lemma 6 .  A similar argument shows we cannot have 
1 1 yPx . So we must have xiy . But then pick z = 2 x + iY· By Lemma 8 it
follows that zPx and zPy a contradiction to C A . 3 ) . So we must have 
P ( x )  n P ( y) I 0 .  
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Q.E.D .  
Proof of Preposition 1.1 : We first show that D s2tisfies the
properties stated. 
If x = y, then P (x )  P ( y) and R (x )  R (y) , s o  -XDy. Hence D 
is irreflexive .  
If x F y ,  and xDy , then either P ( x )  !:: P ( y) or R (x )  !:: R (y) . In 
either case -yDx . So D is asymmetric .  
I f  xDy and yDz then P (x )  � PCy)  and P ( y) � P ( z) , s o  
P Cx l  !:: P ( z) . Also R (x )  !:: R (y) and R (y) !:: R ( z) . So R (x )  !:: R (z) . Also 
at least one of these inclusions is strict since for the inclusions 
P ( x )  !:: P(y)  and R {x )  !:: R ( y) , at l east one is strict . So xDz . 
Acyclicity follows directly fran the fact that D is asymmetric 
and transitive. 
does.  
So D satisfies the stated properties. We now show that C 
If x = y, then -xPy = > -xCy . So C is irreflexive .  
If x F y ,  then xCy => xPy => -yPx => -yCx. Hence C is
asymmetric .  
If xCy and yCz ,  then xDy and yDz and xPy and yPz .  By an 
argument similar to above,  it follows D is transitive,  so xDz. But 
since yDz, it follows that P ( y) !:: P ( z) . Thus 
xPy => x e P ( y) => x e P C z) => xPz . Thus xDz and xPz . I . e . , xCz . So 
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C is transitive.  
As above,  acyclicity of C follows from transi tivity and 
asymmetry. 
Finally, for any x . y  £ X, xCy => xDy and xPy => x e P ( y) and 
P (x) :: P C y) . But x '  P Cx l , so P (x )  � P ( y) . Hence xDy . Thus C � D.  
Q. E . D. 
m * Proof of Proposition 1.1 : Let {yi ) i=l be a sequence with yi -7 y e X ,
and with yi s D ( x )  for all i .  Thus for al l  i ,  P ( yi ) !;;; P(x)  and
R ( yi) ::  R (x ) . Assume y
•
; D( x ) . Then either P ( y* > ¢ P ( x )  or 
• 
R ( y  l ¢ R (x) . . �-If P ( y ) ¢ P (x ) , then set G = X - P ( x ) . Since P ( x )  is
• 
open, G is open, and G n P ( y  ) f 0 .  Hence , by lower hemi continuity
• • 
of P, Lemma 4 ,  there is a neighborhood N ( y  ) of y such that 
• • 
P ( y) n G I  0 for all y E N ( y  ) .  In particular , since Yi -7 y ' 
P C yi) n G f 0 for some yi . But this contradicts P ( yi) £ P (x ) , so we 
• 
must have P ( y  l £ PCx) . 
Now assume R ( y* ) ¢ R (x ) . Now set G = X - R (x) . Again G is 
• 
open and R Cy ) n G I O .  Again,  w e  can apply lower hemi continuity of 
• • 
R to get a neighborhood N ( y  ) of y for which R ( y) n G I 0 for 
• 
y e  N ( y  ) ,  but then R (yi) n G I  O for some i ,  which contradicts
R ( yi) !;;;; R(x) . 
Q .E .D .  
Proof of  Proposition 1·1 = xDy => P (x )  :: P (y )  and xDy => R (x )  :: R ( y)
follows directly from the defini tion of D, so we need only show the 
reverse implications . We show P (x) :: P ( y) <=> R Cx ) :: R (y) . Then 
clearly either one of these inclusions implies xDy. By Lemma 7 ,  
P ( x )  = [ R (x J J 0 for all x .  hence R (x )  :: R ( y) = >  [R (x J J 0 E [ R ( y) J 0 
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= >  P Cx l :: P ( y) . N ow  assume PCxl :: P ( y) . If P ( x )  I O . then Lemma 7 
implies R (x )  = P (x )  E P(y)  = R ( y) . If P ( x l  = 9 ,  then Lemma 8 implies 
R (x )  = {x} . But P ( x )  = 9 => y ; P (x)  => x e R ( y) so R (x )  !; R ( y) . 
This proves the first l ine of implication. The second and third l ines 
follow directly using the definitions of D and C in terms of D .  
Proof o f  Proposition 1.f: For any x , z  e X 
-2 3 z e P ( x )  <=> y e X s .  t .  xPy d yPz 
<=> 3 Y e X s .  t .  y I R (x )  d y e P ( z) 
<=> P ( z ) ¢ R Cx l
= >  P C zl ¢ P Cx l
= >  - zDx 
Q . E . D. 
Now if Assumptions Al and Bl are met , then by Lemma 7 and Prop 3 .3 ,
the last two impl ications become <=> . 
Q . E.D.  
Proof of Proposition ! ·l : To show n P
2 C y) :: UD (X ) , pick x E n P2 C y) 
yeX yeX 
( the proof is trivial if this set is empty) . Then, for all y s X .  
-2 y e  P ( x ) . By Proposi tion 3 .4 ,  -yDx. Thus x e UD(X ) . 
The fact that UD(X ) :: UC (X)  follows directly from C !.:: D. 
To show UC(X) :: n R2 C y) , let x e UCCX ) . Then, for all
yex 
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y e  X .  -yCx . I . e . , -(P ( y) !: P (x ) )  or - (R (y)  !: R (x ) ) or -yPx. But 
-yPx => xRy => x eR2 C yJ . Next,  -(R (y) !;;; R ( x ) ) => 3 z  e X with· zRy and
-zRx . I . e . , zRy and xPz . so x e R2 C y) . 
Finally , - ( P (y) !: P (x ) )  => 3 z  e X with zPy and -zPx . I . e . , 
zPy and xRz . So x e R2 ( y) . 
To show the second assertion, we need only show that under Al 
and Bl , n R2 C yl !: n P!(y) . First we show that R2 C y) !: P!( y) , for 
yex yex 
any y e  X .  L�t z e R2 C y) .  Then 3 w e  X with wRy and zRw. But now. 
by Lei::ma 7 ,  R (w) = P ( w) , so for any neighborhood N ( z )  of z ,  
N C z 1 n P Cwl F d .  By lower hemi continuity of P ( Lemma 4 ) , there is a 
neighborhood, N ( w) of w such that , for al l  w '  e N (w) , 
N ( z) n P ( w ' ) F d .  Now , since R ( y) = P (y J , we can pick w '  e N C wl with 
w ' Py .  Then picking z '  e P (w ' )  n N ( z) , we have z '  e P2 ( y) , so 
z e �. But now , we have n R2 (y)  !: n P!( y) = """flP1"Cy) . To show 
yd yd yd 
the last equality , note that Z E n p%(y) (=) for al l  y £ X, and
yeX 
every neighborhood, N ( z l  of z ,  N ( z) n P2 C yl = d. <=> for every
neighborhood, N ( z )  of z .  N ( z )  n [ n P2 C y l )  F d < => z B n �C y) .  
yeX yeX 
Q. E. D. 
Proof of Proposition f.1_: x I MCD . Al => 3z e A with zDx . But then
(x , z} is a chain, which , by the Kuratowski Lemma, is part of a maximal 
chai n, say E !: A. But by the proof of Theorem 1 ,  E has an upper 
bound, say y.  I . e . , yDw or y = w for all w e  E.  It follows that 
so 
f e E but by transitivity of D ,  we must have D ( y) &. Otherwise E is 
not maximal . 
Proof of Proposition f.!: Suppose n P ( xj l 0 .!i( D , X l  = - · and pick 
j 
x g n P(xj ) .  Then since x I M<D .Xl , by Proposition 4 . 2 ,  3 y £ t!.CD . X l
j 
with yDx. I . e . P (y) !: P ( x )  and R ( y) !: R Cx )  ( one strict ) .  But since 
j j j -1 -1 x e n  P (x  ) ,  we have x Px for all j ,  or (x ) !: P (x )!: P ( y) . So 
j 
yPxj for all j .  But then y s n P (xj ) n t!_(D , X J , a contradiction. The
j 
proof of the second inequality is similar .  
• 
Proof of Proposition 1.1: Assume there is some xi e A with xiCA xt . 
. - . 
I . e . , xi Pxt and xiDAxt ' By the definition of the sophisticated 
• • 
equival ent . it follows that xt = xk = xk for some xk e A .  There ar e
two cases :  
Case 1 :  i < k Her e .  from the definition of the sophisticated 
• • 
equivalent , since x
k = xk
' we have x
kPxj 
for all j < k . But since
• 
xiDAxk ' it follows that for j < i ,  xiPxj . 
• • • 
Otherwise 
xj e R (xi ) => xj e R (xk ) => -xkPxj ' a contradiction. But then, by the
• • 
defini tion of the sophisticated equivalent ,  xi = xi . But xk = xk and 
• 
i < k => xkPxi => xkPxi ' a contradiction.
• • 
Case 2 :  i > k . Now, since xk = xk ' xkPxj for all j < k. By xiDAxk ' 
• • 
it follows that xiPxj for all j < k • But for k i j < i ,  xj = xk ' 
• • • 
si nce x n = xk. But then xiPxk =>xiPxj for k i j < i .  Hence xiPxj for
all j < i ,  which means, by the definition of the sophisticated 
• • 
equivalent . that xi = xi . But this is a contradiction to xn = xk • 
• 
since this would imply xi = xk also . 
So .  in both cases . we get a contradiction. implying that for 
. - . a�� xk e A. we cannot have xkPxt ,and xkDAxt . 
• • 
It follows that 
- xkCAxt . so xt e M C CA . A ) . This proves the first assertion; the 
Sl 
second follows immediately from the observation that if P is anti 
symmetric ,  then xDAxt => xPxt • hence by the -first part of the theorem,
xPxt =>  -xDxt => -XDAxt . a contradiction. So for all x e A . --xDAxt . 
I . e  • • xt e tfCDA. Al . 
Q . E . D. 
APPENDIX B 
This appendix provides formal defini tions of the sets 
cmcx . y . t )  as well as a proof of the proposi tions of section 8 .  
S 2  
Further details can be found i n  Ferejohn, McKelvey. and Packel [1981] . 
Let 0 ( x )  = C e1 Cx l . e2 C x l  • • • • •  em-l ( x ) . p ( x ) ) denote the m 
dimensional . spherical coordinates of the vector x e Rm. Thus 
p ( x )  l lx 1 1
Qnd, for l � i � m-1 . 
0i ( x )  = sin
-1 ! ( x )  Tfxicos0j ( x )l p j < i  
n n Here .  the ej range between
-2 and 2• except for en-l ' which ranges 
n n • • m • between � and 32. Now for any x , y  a R • and t e R .  we set 
(Bl l 
C B2 l  
r• = l lx
• 
- y
•
l l .  and l et Q be  an  m x m orthonormal rotation matrix 
such that 
• 
• • 
Q ( y  - x ) C t . o • • • • •  o> • 
Wri te Q (x-x ) = C z1 • • • . •  zm) z. Then define
C B3 )  
• • � • • (x)  = 0 ( Q( y  - x ) )
x . y  
0 ( z) . So \ • • ( x )  are m dimensional 
x . y  
• 
spherical coordinates of x which are centered at x and have one axis 
• • 
coincident with the vector y - x • Now set 
• 
. -1 -t n n a = sin �.- where ""2 i a i 2·  
r 
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( B4 )  
S o  that the above i s  al so well defined for the case when l t* I 2 r• . we 
use the convention that . for r £ m .  I I -1 n r 2 1 .  sin r = 2 sgn r .  We
then set 
ll if m > 2 2 
p = n - a if m = 2 
• Then define , for t e m .
cfD • • • • (x . y  , t ) = (x 8 x l o i p( z) i 2r sin 91 ( z) + t 
• 
• 
a i e1 C zl i p ( where z = Q(x - x l l l 
( BS )  
and 
( B6 )  
Thus , cf!lcx
•
. y
•
, t
•
) i s  the m dimensional cardioid with cusp at 
• • • • x ' center at y , eccentricity of t , and radius of r • Note that if 
t
• = O ,  then cf!l cx• , y• . t• ) becomes a sphere .  with center at y• and 
• • 
radius r • If t < 0 ,  then the resulting cardioid is contained in 
this sphere. otherwise i t  contains the sphere. Also note that if 
• 
t -r· . then CZ1cx· . y· . t· ) = e . 
Proposition 8 . 1 Let Assumptions A3 and B2 be met . Let y e X and 
r £ ]i + be chosen so that for every median hyperplane H ( a , c ) , with
a e ]i m, c  e m , that H ( a , c )  n B ( y , r ) # e .  Then
cf!lcx.y. - 2r> � P <x >  � R < x >  � cf!lcx.y.2r> 
Proof We write Bo for B(y, r) . and tl for the set of all median
hyperplanes.  Pick x e m m . and set r = 1 1  x - yl I .  We choose
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coordinates so that B0 is centered at ( r , 0 ,  • • •  ,0) , ( which translates
to (� . 0 • • • •  ,0 , r) in spherical coordinates) , and so that x is at the 
origin.  Now e1 (actually I - e1 J measures the angle an  arbitrary
point y,  with spherical coordinates C 91 , • • •  , en-l ' p )  makes with the
axis between the origin and the center of B0 • We consider the points
on the ray from the origin thru y ,  and characterize those points on 
the ray which are in P (x )  and R (x ) . We assume y is of unit length. so 
p ( y) = l l y l l = 1 .  A point on the ray is of the form AY. with A >  O ,
and has spherical coordinates which are the same as  those of  y ,  except 
p ( Ay)  = A.
First note that the set  of median hyperplanes in the direction 
y is a closed set . I . e . , ( c  e m  I H C y, cl e Ml i s  closed . So we let 
cL and cH be the inf and sup of (c e m  I H C y, c )  e Ml . and set
HL = H ( y, cL) and HH = H ( y ,  cH) .  Of course if n is odd , HL = HH. By 
virtue of Assumption A3 , we get,  for A > 0,  
AY e P (x )  <=> A < 2cL 
C B7 )  
AY e R (x )  < => A i 2cH 
But . by assumption of the Lemma 
(cL . cH } !:'. ( c  e ]i I H C y. c )  n Bo#OJ . Letting bL and bH be the inf and
sup of this latter set , we get 
Consequently 
bL i cL i CH i bH 
A < 2bL = >  A < 2cL => AY e P Cx l  
and 
AY & R Cx l  => A i 2cH => A i 2bH 
SS 
C BS )  
C B9 )  
But . by construction. bL and � are obtained simply by proj ecting the
center . y, of B on y ,  and then adding or subtracting the radius , r of
B. I . e . , 
bL = r sin e1 - r 
bH = r sin e1 + r .
So , since A = p ( Ay) Ap ( y) , we have for any w = Ay , A >  O. 
p ( w) < 2r sin el ( w) - 2r  => w E P (x )
w t  R (x )  => p ( w) i 2 r  sin e1 Cwl + 2r.
now . applying defini tion ( B6 ) , we get for any w = Ay , A > O .  
m - -w & C ( x , y ,-2rl  => w & P Cx l  
m - -w & R Cx l  => w E C C x ,y ,2rl 
( Bl O) 
C Bll l  
C B1 2 l  
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Since y is an arbi trary unit length vector , the resul t of the Lemma 
foll ows directly .  
Q . E . D .  
Figure Al illustrates the construction o f  Lemma 8 . 1  for the 
two dimensional case.  
Proof of Proposition i.i: Let y & B(y, t  - 4t) . So 
l ly - yl l ! l lx - yl l - 4t. Then from Lemmas 8 .1 and 8 .2 .
P (y) !: �(y,y ,2t) !: BCy. l ly - yl l + 2t)  
!;;;; B (y, I I x  - yl I - 2t ) !; �Cx.y, - 2tl !; P Cx l . 
So P (y) !; P ( x ) , and a simil ar chain shows R ( y) !;; R (x l . Also y e  P(x) 
and y ; P (y) , so the inclusion P (y) !; P ( x )  is strict , hence y e  D Cx l . 
as we wished to show .  The second assertion follows in  exactly 
analogous argument . 
Q . E . D .  
FIGURE Al ILLUSTRATION Of CONSTRUCTION FOR LEMMA 1 
5 7  
c2< x ,y,2r) 
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